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ABSTRACT 
 
     Biological agents are used for one purpose only:  terrorism.  The United States 
has struggled through the initial shock of September 11, 2001 when it experienced 
its first terrorism attack.  In hindsight, the response was awkward, reflexive, and 
visceral in initial emotion; the time has now come to organize for long-term 
planning.  Planning a set of effective responses matched with programming 
appropriate resources will prove challenging.  One author suggests "We have not 
given adequate thought to the layers of these processes in biological defense" 
(Larsen, 2007, p. 7).   
     Occupational and environmental health nurses (OEHNs) are seeking 
information about biodefense practices, especially for planning and managing a 
Category A agent attack such as anthrax.  Dr. Bonnie Rogers' (2003) systems 
model is a template that may be utilized to address the OEHN response to 
biodefense response planning.  
      The purpose of this paper is to describe the history of biological terrorism 
(bioterrorism), and review biological threats with a focus on anthrax, the most 
significant of the 6 Category A agents.  This paper will also discuss federal 
agencies involved in biodefense preparation and explore the critical role of the 
occupational and environmental health nurse (OEHN) in developing tools and a 
logical, useful response plan to the threat of anthrax grounded in Rogers' 
conceptual framework.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
     The United States of America has experienced acts of terrorism in the past that 
have shocked American citizens.  In September 2001, the use of the biological 
agent, Anthrax, caused the death of five people.  
     Anthrax is especially frightening because there are no warning signs, 
precursors, and no indicators until an attack has already taken place.  Anthrax is 
identified as a Category A agent by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC, 2009a; 2009b).  It is not easily disseminated, but difficult to 
diagnose.  Anthrax attacks the pulmonary, gastrointestinal, and dermatological 
systems and is difficult to differentiate because the symptoms are easily confused 
with those of influenza (Salazar, 2002).  
     The attack on September 2001 is known as the Amerithrax attack and was 
initiated by a Department of Defense (DoD) scientist, Dr. Bruce Ivins of Fort 
Dietrick, Maryland.  Dr. Ivins became frustrated with the ethical limits of animal 
testing and decided to launch a clinical trial to evaluate the human response to 
anthrax exposure, a true mile marker in the history of biologic agents in the 
United States (US).  Letters containing anthrax bacilllus were mailed to 2  
senators and locations in Florida and New York.  Scientists noted the specific 
genetic code associated with Ames anthrax.  Within scientific circles, the Ames 
strain was exclusive property of the US biodefense community at Fort Dietrick, 
MD, which led to quick identification of its origin.  
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     As unfounded reports circulated within government circles regarding credible 
American scientists, an anthrax expert, Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg challenged 
the potential conflicts of interests within the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and DoD's stance in the case.  Dr. Rosenberg was summoned to testify 
before a Senate Judicial committee.  A FBI investigation identified Steven Hatfill 
as a "person of interest", but he was later cleared.  By this time 5 people died, 
approximately 17 were seriously ill, and thousands were exposed to anthrax 
(History Channel, 2008).  The impact of these attacks included two branches of 
the government shutting down temporarily including postal operations around the 
country.  Eighteen individuals in five states contracted anthrax and became sick.  
More than 33,000 postal workers required post-exposure anaphylaxis.  Costs to 
the US Postal Service approached $3 billion and two facilities, the American 
Media building in Florida and the Brentwood postal facility in the nation's capital, 
were shut down and remain closed.  Clean-up costs were expected to exceed $24 
million (Heyman, 2002).  There is no way to measure the cost in terms of human 
lives, prevention of future attacks, and management of the Amerithrax attack.  
     The purpose of this paper is to describe the history of biological terrorism and 
biological defense, review anthrax as an "ideal" Category A agent, and describe 
methods of anthrax exposure, triage, treatment, and risk classification.  It will also 
provide an overview of eight government agencies' biological response plans.  
These agencies include the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Act (FEMA), Federal Bureau of 
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Investigation (FBI), Department of Defense (DoD), Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the 
American Red Cross (ARC).  The lack of a unified command structure will be 
described.  In the absence of a government coalition, nursing professionals must 
collectively address the topic of bioterrorism defense.   
     While the occupational and environmental health nurse (OEHN) realizes the 
potential for a biological attack, a biological response plan may not be in place.  
The role of the OEHN in the development of a response plan for anthrax exposure 
will be explored.  Resources must be identified and applied effectively.  Using the 
Rogers' systems model, the OEHN will address external and internal influences, 
inputs, throughputs, outputs, interventions, and feedback mechanisms.  By 
utilizing this model, the biological response plan will be specific to the worksite.  
The OEHN has both the public health knowledge and corporate experience to take 
the lead in developing an anthrax response plan.    
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     Much has been written about the effects of biological agents and biodefense; 
much less has been written about the planning requirements and management of 
such an attack, particularly from an occupational and environmental health 
nursing perspective.     
Definition   
     The Department of Justice (DOJ) (2009), along with the National Institute of 
Justice and FBI jointly define bioterrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use 
of force or violence against persona or property to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives" (para 3).  The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (2009a; 2009c) concur with this definition as part of the federal 
certification process of a terrorist event and use that definition as the basis of their 
evolving morbidity and mortality coding processes.  
History of Bioterrorism  
     The history of anthrax-related terrorism by rogue professional survivalists 
against US citizens within the continental borders started with the killing five 
people in September 2001.  There are varying opinions regarding the actual use of 
anthrax versus the perception or threat to use.  According to Leitenberg (2005),   
There are four factual significant events involving biological 
agents, three of which involved anthrax.  These incidents include 
the Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon use of salmonella on food in 
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1984, the Japanese Aum Shinriko's unsuccessful attempts to 
procure, produce and disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin in 
1994, Al Qaida's unsuccessful efforts to obtain anthrax and to 
prepare a facility in which to do microbiological work in 2001 and 
the successful "Amerithrax" distribution of high-quality dry-
powder preparation of anthrax spores in 2001. (p. 22)   
     The most recent event, the Amerithrax incident, involved an aerosolized white 
anthrax powder believed to be mailed by Dr. Bruce Ivins in Fort Dietrick, 
Maryland.  Events such as mailing letters containing high grade anthrax to the 
Sun Newspaper in Florida and to Senators Daschle and Leahy closed the Hart 
Senate Office Building for months.  CBS, NBC, and ABC television networks 
received letters filled with anthrax, and staff for Tom Brokaw and Dan Rather 
contracted the cutaneous form of the disease.  Biological attacks remain 
dangerously elusive; there are no warning signs, precursors, ominous changes, 
and no indicators until the attack had already taken place.  The threat to life was 
and remains real and exponential.  A Nobel Laureate in microbiology, Dr. Joshua 
Lederberg (2002) believes, "Today one man can make war.  A lucky bio-buffoon 
could kill 400,000 people" (Larsen, 2007, p. 57).  Larsen writes that while the 
intent or capability of fanatics may not be controlled, the consequences may be 
managed by "containment" (p. 82).  Larsen further submits his belief that through 
"investing in research into vaccines, treatments, and building a public health and 
care delivery system that can rapidly detect and treat an epidemic, we may contain 
an attack and its effects" (p. 118-119). 
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Category A Agents 
     The CDC (2009a) identifies six Category A agents or biological threat 
categories (in alphabetic order for reader convenience): bacillus anthracis 
(anthrax), clostridium botulinum (botulism), yersinia pestis (plague), variola 
major (smallpox), francisella tularensis (tularemia), and viral hemorrhagic fever 
(lassa fever, dengue, hanta, marburg, ebola viruses, etc.).  An "ideal biological 
agent" possesses twelve characteristics: pathogenicity to humans, animals, and 
plants; ability to produce severe disease; effectiveness at low doses; high disease 
rates; highly infectious; not necessarily contagious; aerosol transmissibility; 
availability of vaccines; easily and rapidly produced; size from 1 to 5 microns 
lends to aerosol delivery; concentrated, environmentally stable; and is easily 
weaponized (Lederberg, 2002).         
     The CDC (2009c) describes Category A agents, specifically anthrax, as "easily 
disseminated or transmitted from person to person with high mortality, potential 
major public health impact and public panic/social disruption; requiring special 
action for public health preparedness" (p. 1).  As the threat of an anthrax attack 
increases, Bartlett (2002) cites three key factors for the waging of biological 
warfare: the desire to use it, ability to acquire it, and capability of delivery.  While 
the threat of biological agents may not prove as probable as weapons of mass 
destruction or a suicide bombing, individually or collectively, these biological 
agents pose potential devastating and lethal blows to local, state, and national 
healthcare systems.    
 
 7 
 
Anthrax Exposure 
     Anthrax, which attacks the pulmonary, gastrointestinal, and dermatological 
systems, is well-known as a formidable biological agent with small, sturdy, stable, 
easily aerosolized, and dispersed spores.  Salazar's (2002) work with this agent 
reveals it is easily confused with influenza.  From practical experience with the 
threat of inhalation anthrax within the halls of Congress in 2001, one occupational 
and environmental health nursing expert reported multiple challenges associated 
with the process of diagnosis protocols and "nasal swabbing" technique for 
individuals in potential "hot zones".  Initially, frightened and confused, those "hot 
zone" candidates received briefings, counseling, phone hot lines, and a sixty day 
trial of antibiotics to effectively treat a suspected, but unconfirmed anthrax attack 
(Anderson & Eisold, 2002).  Anthrax is a highly effective respiratory agent, 
immobilizing humans with a severe pulmonary infection, leading to septicemia 
and death.  The spores lodge in the alveolar spaces and are destroyed in part by 
the macrophage response; the remaining spores are then transported into the 
lymphatic system where they germinate in about 60 days, replicating bacteria 
release with at least two well known toxins (edema and lethal factors) that lead to 
disease.  OEHNs must learn to recognize the circumstances of a potential 
exposure and assess initial symptoms of influenza-like illnesses which might 
include an anthrax exposure.   
     Anthrax is most dangerous through inhalation exposure.  A few kilograms can 
kill as many people as the Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon.  Transmission from 
person to person is of little concern.  Use of chest X-rays, blood cultures, and 
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gram staining for Bacillus Anthracis are the most effective diagnostic tools 
available (Salazar, 2002).   
     Triage 
     The process of triage becomes critical as levels of worker acuity are prioritized 
against resources with increased time demands for additional tests, exam area 
decontamination, and communication with the National Response Center and 
CDC creating time delays.  Dr. Lee (2007) recommends observance of standard 
precautions in handling patients, clothing, and body fluids.  "Isolation" differs 
from "quarantine".  Effective isolation of known, infected patients requires 
segregation from the healthy, an immediate priority.  "Quarantine" addresses 
general bounds placed on an exposed, but still healthy population.  Healthcare 
providers, clinicians, staff, firemen, and law enforcement take priority in 
receiving care in order to manage the exponential number of "worried well" and 
"walking wounded" (Lee).   
     Treatment 
     Treatment for anthrax exposure means immediate dosing with antibiotics such 
as ciprofloxacin and doxycycline for up to sixty days (Salazar).  The National 
Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) conducted two toxin studies 
which promise leads in developing two new antimicrobial anthrax drugs.  Even 
with treatment, the historical fatality rate is 75%.  Without mechanical respiratory 
support, death occurs typically within 24-36 hours.  There is currently no 
screening test.  The vaccine, anthrax vaccine absorbed (AVA), is reserved for 
protection of military personnel in high-threat areas (National Institutes of Health/ 
 9 
 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases [NIH/NIAID], 2002).  It is 
incumbent upon all OEHNs to know and understand the routes of exposure, 
treatment, and how to access public health resources. 
     Risk Classifications  
     The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) (2009b) 
establishes foundation information for the OEHN by identification of risk 
classifications for an anthrax attack cited as red, yellow, and green zones in 
descending order of risk.  In the event of an exposure, the OEHN should 
understand the concepts and context behind the application of these OSHA 
designators within their worksite. Red zones are defined as worksites where 
emergency response is in progress or contamination has been confirmed.  Yellow 
zones are worksites where bulk mail is handled, areas in close proximity to 
contamination or potential terrorism targets.  Green zones are relatively low risk 
and consist with most worksites in the country.  As the exposure plan is 
developed, this information should be part of the plan. As the OEHN teaches the 
exposure plan to worksite staff, this information should be part of that education 
process.   
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CHAPTER III 
EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT 
Evolution of a National Response      
     The potential risk for biological agent attack and exposure is currently limited 
to hypothetical modeling and a handful of unclassified exercises; the topic is 
culturally unthinkable to the average American.  Biological defense forums have 
sprung up throughout the country since September 11, 2001.  Although the 
government efforts appear well-funded in general, the literature reveals immature, 
poorly coordinated processes and weak efforts in planning, policy, research, 
education, and ultimately practices and processes (Larsen, 2007).  As forums 
congregate to study the requirement to plan and execute rapid response, the 
requirements for organizational agreement, consistency, and coordination are 
obvious.   
Research Laboratories  
     While citizens read about bioterrorism issues in general terms, new research 
laboratories are quietly being planned, programmed, funded, and constructed with 
little fanfare throughout the country.  These facilities, graded as biosafety levels 1 
through 4, focus on research in high-risk biological threats and are located at the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia; an 
unnamed facility in San Antonio, Texas; an unnamed facility in Hamilton, 
Montana; the United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID) in Fort Dietrick, Maryland; the National Emerging Infectious 
Diseases Laboratories at the Boston University Medical Center; and at the 
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University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, Texas. Charged with 
researching biological agents and developing vaccines, these facilities provide 
highly secure, redundant isolation chambers.  The design of these facilities allows 
staff to work at ease with personal protective equipment (PPE) as they study 
deadly agents, such as anthrax, and their infectious processes (NIH/NIAID, 2007).   
     One of these research facilities, USAMRIID (2004) is now associated with the 
infamous "Amerithrax" investigation with the suicide of Dr. Bruce E. Ivins of 
Fort Dietrick, Maryland on July 31, 2008.  An anthrax authority for 35 years 
within the federal government, this scientist was awarded the 2003 Decoration for 
Exceptional Civilian Service, the highest honor given to DoD civilian employees, 
for his work in anthrax.  Dr. Ivins performed significant research on various 
combinations of anthrax strains to optimize an effective vaccine.  Allegedly, he 
became frustrated with the constraints of research on animals versus humans and 
is believed to have mailed anthrax spores to prominent members of the Senate, 
newsrooms, and public places in 2001 as part of a spurious human test project.  
The FBI was investigating and preparing charges for five deaths associated with 
the mailing of anthrax through the postal system.  With a long known history of 
making homicidal tendencies since college days, Ivins was under psychiatric 
evaluation for stalking and making death threats to a numerous individuals.  His 
family stated he had been the focus of relentless FBI surveillance and 
investigation since 2002 when the United States Attorney General named him a 
"person of interest" in association with Steven Hatfill who was later cleared of 
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charges.  With Ivins' death, the Department of Justice is considering closure of the 
"Amerithrax" investigation, pending more suspects (Fox News, 2008).   
     There is a preponderance of literature addressing the history of biological 
threat in the US.  From the public health officials at the CDC to private experts, 
such as retired Colonel Randy Larsen, United States Air Force, there is much 
conceptual knowledge on how to manage the threat of anthrax.  There is less 
written on the specific and actual application of practical knowledge in dealing 
with anthrax.  There is even less written on protection of individuals and  
worksites.   
Government and Private Training Events  
    Numerous government and private training events have demonstrated the 
advantages of partnering as they test and improve mutually beneficial joint 
programs.  A federally funded training event, Top Officials (TOPOFF) 3, 
illustrates the benefits of collaboration in supply management knowledge (New 
Jersey Center for Public Health Awareness at University of Medicine and 
Dentistry of New Jersey [NJCPHR at UMDNJ], 2005).  Colonel Randy Larsen 
states that the form and substance of such planning stems from "asking the right 
questions" in the beginning of planning for a biological attack (Larsen, 2007,  
p. 125).   
     Larsen emphasizes,  
          Our disjointedness and ineffectiveness in planning for a biological 
attack lies in the failure to address core issues such as personal 
survival such as the "ability to survive and operate" (ATSO) linked 
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to our ability and willingness to think through and periodically 
exercise the expectations and processes of a useful, multipurpose 
all hazards plan to an 85% solution (p. 199).   
He simplifies the process by illustrating the personal resources an 
individual would need to survive and then amplifies those resources to 
organizational levels in the private and government sectors.  Two 
examples which might be examined include the technology behind 
WalMart's "just in time" distribution networks and individual 
infrastructure models as evidenced with Hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans (Larsen, 2007).  During this event, WalMart implemented their 
emergency logistics/supply software and processes to provide shelter, 
food, and necessary supplies to the Gulf Coast when it was needed 
(Walmartstores, 2008). 
     There is a distinct void in planning and resourcing through government and 
private sector readiness and organizational roles and individual responsibilities.   
Agencies Involved in Biodefense Preparation  
     There are 57 federal agencies, 50 states, 8 territories and 3,066 counties 
involved in homeland security.  For the sake of brevity and relevance, eight 
government bodies and their relationships in biodefense are described.       
     National Security Agency (NSA)   
     The NSA is the premier US intelligence community located at Fort Meade, 
Maryland.  The NSA originated from the DoD's Armed Forces Security Agency 
in the late 1940s.  Due to the level of national security concerns, the website 
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identifies assurance, encryption, and decryption as their primary missions.  Little 
information is publicly posted or known concerning bioterrorism planning efforts 
within this agency.  Criticized by Congress for a void of Congressional oversight, 
the NSA has been under scrutiny for failure to adapt to a post Cold War 
environment and overzealous monitoring and intrusion into privacy of individual 
citizens (National Security Agency [NSA], 2008).  
     Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  
     The DHHS sponsored their first anti-bioterrorism initiative in 2000.  Within 
the DHHS (2008), the CDC is the premiere national antiterrorism health agency.  
The CDC addresses the epidemiology, exposure pathways, and environmental 
sources, to establish treatment regimens.  Questions now arise regarding change 
to this approach with the deliberate spread of a virulent biological agent 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology [MIT], 2008).   
     Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency    
     Management Agency (FEMA)   
 
     The DHS is rich in examples of lessons learned.  There have been many 
examples of successful modeling with simulation and exercise planning and 
execution to include TOPOFF, TOPOFF 3, and more recently the TOPOFF 4 in 
Connecticut and New Jersey (NJCPHP at UMDNJ, 2005; New Jersey Business 
Force, 2007).  The Department of Homeland Security and the DoD have 
sponsored exercises such as the TOPOFF program since 2003 (NJCPHP at 
UMDNJ).  TOPOFF involves an arduous two year cycle of seminars and planning 
sessions resulting in assessment of the "nation's capacity to prevent, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist activities involving Weapons of Mass 
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Destruction (WMD)" (New Jersey Business Force, 2007).  Believing that private 
businesses (to include health systems) and government functions (to include 
public health resources) can complement each other, TOPOFF 4 involved the 
private sector to assess/test their internal level of preparation with a table top 
exercise, use of virtual news networks, computer firewalls, and local business, 
communication, and environmental constraints.  
     As a result, the Business Emergency Operation Center (BEOC) was created.  
Jointly planned, designed, and developed with private and retired corporate 
managers and military talent, this center developed a scenario where participants 
had to address and continuously prioritize and re-prioritize immediate, post-attack 
priorities:   
1. What is my number one priority?   
2. Who do I turn to for credible information?   
3. On what type of information do I base decisions?   
4. What to tell staff and employees?   
5. Where is the nearest shelter?   
6. With whom can I share information collected?   
7. Can employees get back and forth to work and how?   
8. Where is the policy for treating contaminated employees?   
 (NJCPHP at UMDNJ, 2005) 
     Roadways and highways outside the affected areas were gridlocked.  Red 
Cross volunteers set up shelters for aid and resources.  On the next day of the 
exercise, some success in resource recovery was appreciated in decontamination 
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efforts; re-occupancy of enterprises, schools, universities, and government 
offices; reopening of major highways, airports, and waterways; restoration of 
utilities; reestablishment of supply chain and revenue stream; reemergence of  
healthcare recovery, addressing large scale physician and mental health needs; 
and lastly, restoration of citizen and employee confidence (New Jersey Business 
Force, 2007).  At the conclusion of TOPOFF 4, the evaluators recommended the 
following "lessons learned".  They addressed how to integrate the BEOC model 
into coordinated government responses, the BEOC systems into existing software 
systems, and to develop a microcosm of sub-systems to fill information gaps 
versus individual systems.  They addressed specific experiential learning for all 
employees, such as employee emergency procedures and readiness to respond, all 
of which seems intuitively obvious (New Jersey Business Force).  However, this 
was not the case.  Learning took place in the private sector as evidenced during 
Hurricane Katrina.  Improvements in the private sector, such as WalMart, 
demonstrated commendable logistics and distribution models which managed and 
utilized information from which the entire nation could learn and benefit (Larsen, 
2007). 
     These exercises, incorporated into the National Response Plan, the National 
Incident Management System, and software/technology for dealing with specific 
hazards, are invaluable in lessons learned (Department of Homeland Security, 
2005).  After-action reports revealed many opportunities to learn from 
weaknesses and response to a biological attack.  TOPOFF 3 results stated the 
concept of points of distribution for medications (PODS) was flawed within the 
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exercise.  Vulnerable to internal contamination, the PODs became a logistical 
nightmare.  Other flaws included the inability to accommodate the breadth of 
fourteen languages spoken in northern New Jersey and Connecticut, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada, and difficulties of compliance with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.  Within the scope of the exercise, participants were mixed in 
their awareness of the biological agent with some factions wearing personal 
protective equipment while others did not.  This skewed the triage process and 
ultimately contaminated the PODs with participants of unknown exposure and 
delayed symptoms.  Recordkeeping became an insurmountable challenge.  
Logistics to feed volunteers became a huge obstacle, particularly in the face of a 
second attack.  The unspoken message: "our resources do not stretch to that 
extent" was noted over and over (NJCPHP at UMDNJ, 2005).   
     Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)   
     The FBI is the primary governmental agency solely tasked and responsible for 
anthrax investigations.  Therefore, "the FBI has a vested interest in the careful 
development of judicial burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in its 
investigation of a crime scene when bioterrorism agents are used" (Larsen, 2007, 
p. 55).  They currently lack the relevant scientific background to interact 
effectively with the CDC which is focused on the epidemiology and pathways of 
exposure, index case, and public health procedures.  According to Larsen, "the 
FBI suspected a domestic terrorist in Amerithrax from the beginning and was 
proven correct" (p. 51).  The FBI has posted detailed information regarding the 
Amerithrax scenario on their website with details of their investigation in 
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unsealed court orders (DOJ, 2008).  Five years after Amerithrax, "America had 
and still has no plan for responding to an attack with anthrax, the most likely 
biological weapon terrorists will use" (Larsen, p. 275).   
     Department of Defense (DoD)   
     The DoD has an extensive history of dealing with biological agents and has 
experience in the first mustard agents hurled at infantry soldiers in World War I.  
The USAMRIID (2005) at Fort Detrick, MD is the Army's research center for 
biological agents.  It organizes and maintains biological agent treatment regimens 
with emergency hotlines and on-line handbooks for healthcare providers.  The 
DoD shares access to FEMA's nationwide hospital bed database.  However, 
bioterrorism plans and information are cloaked in security hindering open and 
joint cooperation with other federal agencies.  In the annual report of level of 
readiness to Congress, the DoD projects available resources will likely be 
scattered, particularly in pulmonary care and support services.  Equipment 
supplies are limited, even within the field DoD stockpiles.  Transportation 
availability will not match the scale required; therefore, valuable beds within local 
hospitals will likely remain occupied and patients will queue into longer and 
longer lines for care.  Should a biological agent attack occur, the federal 
government will augment the efforts of local hospitals, not supersede them 
(Siegrist, 1999).  This presents an ominous situation for local healthcare systems 
and experts with plans shielded from the public domain.  In conclusion, the DoD 
website cites 45 specific references to anthrax and bioterrorism (DoD, 2008).   
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     Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)  
     OSHA has a highly developed and well organized website for management of 
biological agents, including anthrax.  Focused on attacks in the workplace, OSHA 
has effectively linked their technical and regulatory information with the CDC 
and U.S. Army Surgeon.  OSHA offers detailed information to the public and the 
professional on how to recognize, plan, and treat exposures in a biological defense 
scenario.  Currently there is an ongoing effort within OSHA to guide healthcare 
facilities through the process of anthrax planning with the formation of electronic 
tools, templates, and guidance (OSHA, 2003).  Their expansive Anthrax website 
addresses risk factors, excellent planning processes, first responder management, 
and clean-up recommendations (OSHA, 2009a).  
     Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)   
     A detailed strategic plan is posted on the EPA website (EPA, 2008a).  There 
may be classified planning for bioterrorism attacks, but those plans are not in the 
public domain.  Their website has the search engine capability for 575 potential 
anthrax topics (EPA, 2008a; EPA, 2008b).       
     American Red Cross (ARC)   
     The American Red Cross (ARC, 2009) is a private, non-profit agency.  It is 
chartered to:                        
                        carry on a system of national and international relief in time 
of peace and apply the same in mitigating the sufferings 
caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great 
national calamities and to devise and carry on measures for 
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preventing the same.  The charter is not only a grant of 
power, but an imposition of duties and obligations to the 
nation, to disaster victims and to the people who generously 
supply its work with their donations. (p. 1, para 1-3)  
     The ARC provides food, shelter, and health resources with emphasis on mental 
health needs to enable individuals and families to return to their normal daily 
activities independently (ARC, 2009).  There is a set of plans made public on their 
web page for 16 individual environmental disasters, one of which is terrorism.  
The ARC received over a billion dollars in private and public funding since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center known as the Liberty 
Disaster Relief Fund.  The ARC created the September 11 Recovery Program 
(SRP) to provide longer term services for 3 to 5 years to non-profit agencies 
through the Recovery Grants Program for people whose lives were most seriously 
disrupted in the communities where they work and live.  These funds address 
basic access to healthcare, diagnosis and treatment, mental health requirements, 
recovery, and strategic funding (American Red Cross, 2008).  There are links to 
the CDC and specific plans in place for 16 natural disasters.  While terrorism 
attacks are mentioned, little is specific for biological defense. 
     Management of disaster relief is a monumental task.  The scope of resource 
management responsibility is staggering.  One of the ironies of September 11, 
2001 within the ARC disaster relief lies in the overwhelming asymmetrical drain 
versus influx of resources.  Evidence of this is in the large amount of blood 
donated by thousands of generously patriotic Americans after September 11, 
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2001.  Larsen (2007) attests to the irony associated with such a magnanimous 
response that was undermined by current standards, writing "when the 42 day 
limit was reached, this invaluable resource was destroyed" (p. 212).  There was 
simply no way to use it all.  Such is the speculative, uncertain ebb and flow of 
resources in disaster management.   
     A friend of the ARC and one of their community partners, WalMart, made 
donations of $1 million during Hurricane Katrina as well as donated truckloads of 
supplies to victims in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas to supplement ARC 
efforts (Barbaro & Gillis, 2005).   
     The sparse knowledge and concentration of efforts in current biodefense 
practice, planning, policy, research, and education is recognized.  The time is 
overdue for the eight federal and national agencies to assemble, pool, and 
integrate their resources and abilities.  Current awareness of the National Security 
Agency, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland 
Defense/Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Department of Defense, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the American Red 
Cross is limited to the public domain.  It becomes more obvious that each of these 
departments, agencies, and organizations must organize their collective resources 
and capabilities into a cooperative and collaborative plan.  As planning evolves 
and develops in the upper echelons of federal and state government, the OEHN 
has the opportunity to secure a key role in planning the bioterrorism response at 
the worksite by addressing policy, research, education, and practice requirements.  
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As a specialty nursing group, OEHNs must bring education to the process "by 
posing the right questions and searching for effective answers in everyday 
language for the employee and community residents.  This process stems from 
knowledge and education" (Larsen, 2007, p. 125).   
Gap Analysis      
     There are significant gaps in the current business practices within the 
government agencies cited above.  What is known about the current state of the 
eight organizations is scattered and certainly not linked organizationally or 
operationally.  According to Larsen, "there is no unified command structure nor 
responsible body in the government for a biological attack" (p. 129).  There are 
websites, some of which provide open information, with links to relevant 
information scattered among the eight organizations.  Larsen writes that the 
"public and private sectors currently possess their specific models of leadership 
and logistics which would serve as powerful role models for the ability to survive 
and operate (ATSO)" (p. 213).   
     One example which substantiates excellent response planning in the private 
sector is WalMart. In the summer of 2005, a category five hurricane, Katrina, 
struck the coast of Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Gulf Region devastating that 
corner of the country for months.  WalMart's emergency response and logistic 
plans for aid to those disaster stricken communities was well planned and 
orchestrated with positive community outcomes documented (Barbaro & Gillis, 
2005).  
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     According to Horowitz (2009), WalMart believes the best time to plan disaster 
relief is prior to the disaster.  They make their proactive community awareness 
part of their marketing strategy.  WalMart sent management and staff to 
individual storm stricken areas along with millions of dollars in donated 
merchandise to hurricane relief sites.  Using their "emergency operations center" 
which is responsible for mitigating, preparing, and planning the company's 
response to all forms of disaster, WalMart initiated their "just-in-time" logistics 
system.  "Just in time" means they track the trends in items needed via logistics 
system of forty regional distribution centers capitalizing on advantageous 
metropolitan locations to support 75-100 stores within a 250 mile radius 
(Horowitz).  Clearly, the WalMart emergency operations center has established a 
successful strategy of dealing with supply distribution to disaster areas.  They are 
proud of their history of community disaster aid efforts and reputation 
(Walmartstores, 2008).  First, during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, WalMart 
contributed $17 million to aid emergency relief efforts to the ARC, the Salvation 
Army, the Texas Governors Fund, and the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund.  Second, 
they also provided $9.2 million in cash assistance to more than 20,000 associates 
affected by the hurricanes.  Third, they raised more than $7 million in public 
contributions made by customers and employees at over 3,800 locations to 
include Sam's Clubs. Fourth, they raised over $20,000 in animal relief efforts 
following both hurricanes (Walmartstores, 2008).  
     There are significant gaps between the government and private sector.  There 
are few, if any, shared goals, coordination, and effective interaction among the 
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eight government organizations.  The private sector such as WalMart conducts 
business with simple principles such as operations, logistics, and supervision 
executives sitting next to each other to coordinate business practice changes and 
issues, with the example given:  "I need ten trailers of water… I have it 
available…I can get it there: a practice of joint interaction and cooperation from 
which federal government might learn and benefit" (Hayes, 2009, para 1).   
Larsen (2007) writes that when he noted the void of coordination and isolationism 
in the federal government, he posed a similar question to another biodefense 
expert:  is there a database that he could identify and track federally funded 
programs in biodefense, the answer was "no" (p. 129).  
      One recommendation is to "form a directorate for biodefense which would 
overhaul and reorganize both security and intelligence capabilities into one joint 
and cohesive organization similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986" 
(Larsen).  This act forced the branches of the military out of self-serving partisan 
political arenas, rewarding higher levels of joint interaction within the DoD 
(Larsen).   
     Requirements for the biodefense directorate would include professional 
credibility, selection by the president with Senate confirmation, authority on the 
level of the director of national intelligence with direct power over complexities 
such as policy, personnel, and spending programs, and lastly, once the president 
declares a national emergency, the authority to step in as advisor and "combatant 
commander" for that arena, similar to the Central Command in Iraq.  "Proactive 
planning demands this work be done prior to an attack; history teaches that this 
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action will likely not take place until an actual attack occurs with public outcry for 
an improved, effective response (Larsen, 2007).  
     Furthermore, this directorate must be placed outside the beltway to serve the 
distinct interests of democratic process, much like the Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission (BRAC) which streamlined Department of Defense efforts 
in the early 1990's through the present.  Key to this concept is the management of 
information to include intelligence, information systems, and public/private 
databases (Larsen).  Unlike the CIA, this concept would include formation of a 
specific, unified, formal, domestic biodefense intelligence function within the 
geographic boundaries of the United States.  Ironically, this effort would also 
force a double edged sword of awareness and information gathering into both 
current national readiness arena and intrusions into the realms of individual civil 
liberties and personal privacy (Larsen). 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE OCCUPATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NURSE (OEHN) 
ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF A RESPONSE PLAN 
     Health professionals and specifically nursing tend to cling to the safety net of 
"knowns", a wealth of original, parochial nursing knowledge and experience.  
However, little of this knowledge prepares the United States for a biological 
attack.   
     The OEHN is in a key position to develop the organization's bioterrorism 
disaster response plan.  The planning processes must reflect clear, practical, and 
organized directives to communicate the response plan to employees.  Larsen 
(2007) discusses the individual requirements for survival of a biological attack.  
Taking this information from the individual level to the organizational level 
requires working well with others, the ability to identify priorities, and a plan that 
the organization can implement and employees will respect, i.e., the "ability to 
survive and operate" or "ATSO" (Larsen, p. 190).   
Emergency Action Planning 
     As a trusted advisor to employees, the OEHN's advice must be sound, current, 
and credible.  The OEHN should know the effects of a biological agent exposure, 
develop and update worksite readiness plans, and teach employees how to take 
cover with appropriate shelter and personal protective equipment.  The 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA, 2003) illustrates in Table 
4.1 how to develop an emergency action plan complete with details of emergency 
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TABLE 4.1 
EMERGENCY ACTION PLANNING 
Item Action 
Emergency 
identification 
 Provide guidance on how to recognize a 
potential emergency situation or suspicious mail 
Initial actions 
 
Upon identification of a potential anthrax threat or 
release:  
 Isolate the area; minimize exposure to others 
 Turn off fans, ventilation units; shut down air 
handlers 
 Document who came in contact with anthrax for 
public health/law enforcement authorities 
Authority notification  Dial 911 for fire/law enforcement  
 Notify the National Response Center at 1-800-
424-8802 
 Inform senior management and building owners 
Internal notification  Use alarm system to evacuate the building 
and/or take other actions 
Evacuation policy  Develop policy, procedures, and escape routes 
assignments to familiarize employees with 
expectations, evacuation routes, and gathering 
points 
Employee 
Accountability  
 Incorporate procedures to account for 
employees after the evacuation to ensure 
everyone got out 
Organizational 
structure 
 Define employee roles and responsibilities in 
the event of an emergency 
Employee training  Describe how employees will be informed of 
the contents of the plan and trained in their roles 
and responsibilities 
Contact information  List names, titles, departments, and phone 
numbers of employees who can be contacted for 
additional information or clarification of some 
aspect of the plan 
Off-hour contacts  Identify key personnel who should be contacted 
during off-hours 
Emergency drills  Conduct emergency drills to help ensure that the 
EAP actions are carried out properly and safely  
Source:  Adapted from OSHA, 2003    
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identification, initial actions, authority notification, internal notification, 
evacuation policy development, employee accountability, organizational 
structure, employee training, contact information, off-hour contacts and 
emergency drills.  Most importantly, OSHA gives a phone number for the 
National Response Center (NRC) to alert appropriate parties responsible for 
mitigating a biological attack.   
     The time to plan and prepare a response which effectively manages routine and 
emergency employee health and well-being is before the attack occurs.  The 
OEHN is positioned to influence the readiness posture of the organization via 
planning, budgeting, developing, teaching, and reinforcing the practical aspects of 
a response plan to all levels of management.  For example, "bioterrorism 
information sound bite" could be presented at monthly safety meetings based on 
the nursing process: assess, plan, implement and evaluate. 
     Assess   
     What is the current bioterrorism/security climate?  What are the current 
threat(s) to the worksite and employees?  One of the core skills in the emergency 
planning process requires the ability to recognize and assess an emergency 
situation such as an anthrax exposure.  Essential skills include the ability to 
recognize signs and symptoms and to triage the exposed employee into an 
appropriate care area (Lee, 2007).   
     Plan    
     Is there a written plan?  Senior management and building ownership should be 
aware of the resources, processes, and procedures needed for those threats if they 
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happen.  The plan should state how to coordinate with local authorities, fire 
response, and public health as well as the National Response Center at 1-800-424-
8802.  Located in Washington, DC, the National Response Center is a 24/7 call 
center for reporting suspected bioterrorism activity chaired by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and the United States Coast Guard (OSHA, 2003).   
     Implement     
     The implementation phase should be simple and straightforward in the 
beginning, improved with subsequent practice, and practiced annually.  For 
example, there should be a schedule for exercising the plan with an anthrax 
exposure.  Employees must know who authorizes an evacuation, the 
circumstances under which an evacuation would be ordered, how to exit their 
building, and their designated gathering point.  There should be an alarm system 
to evacuate the building with established processes, polices, procedures, and pre-
designated escape routes identified.  Accountability with a roster to departments, 
titles, and phone numbers for organizational control is key to sound information 
management.  This list should include key personnel off-duty phone numbers.  
Employee roles and responsibilities should be identified for organizational 
command and control, communication systems, and expected behaviors and 
actions (OSHA, 2003).   
     Evaluate    
     Process improvement is part of the expectation of practice.  What was learned 
after the exercise?  Were breaks in process or areas for improvement noted?   
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Those breaks in process must be addressed in safety and occupational health 
committees (OSHA, 2003).   
     The OEHN must be familiar with public health resources, knowledge of 
anthrax as a disease process among other Category A agents, recognition of signs 
and symptoms of exposures, and appropriate response to potential exposure at the 
worksite.  An electronic template on the OSHA website can be used to develop a 
response plan (OSHA, 2003).  The OSHA emergency action plan template can be 
compared to the Rogers' Model in order to address a biological attack from a 
multi-dimensional systems perspective.   
The Rogers' Model 
          The Rogers' model addresses assessing, analyzing, and developing health 
and safety programs and may be utilized in planning for a biological attack 
(Rogers, 2003).  Using the model as a template, the response plan should address 
biological factors and environmental influences including technology, economics, 
population, healthcare trends, and legislation (regulation/politics) via systems 
theory with relationships among inputs, throughputs, outputs, and feedback.      
The Rogers' model, illustrated in the Appendix, captures all of the dimensions 
required for expanding and developing sound occupational and environmental 
health nursing practices within the context of the bioterrorism environment.   
     Environmental Influences  
     Rogers states that the context of environmental influences includes a host of 
factors (Rogers).  While Rogers originally focused on the environment of work, 
occupational hazards, and the role of the OEHN, Rogers' model is easily 
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expanded into a different application addressing the practice of occupational and 
environmental health nursing within the arena of biological terrorism.  Perhaps 
the easiest depiction of this concept is found in her model which examines the 
following components of environmental influences: technology, economics, 
population/healthcare trends, and legislation (regulation/politics).   
     Technology  
     The Internet provides a powerful source of information regarding biological 
defense.  The CDC, OSHA, and other agencies have organized their information 
in easy-to-manage links for the public domain.  There is software development in 
biodefense decision support and critical thinking processes within the DoD, but it 
is not available to the public.  As the OEHN looks at current professional 
responsibilities, the nurse must also examine baseline professional practices, 
update knowledge, and adjust planning for increasing levels of security within the 
worksite. Today's plans determine tomorrow's outcomes.     
     Communication systems, including the Internet, provide unprecedented access 
to information about anthrax and general biological defense.  However, in the 
potential absence of electrical power during a biologic attack such as anthrax, 
clear, well-designed, and established manual processes are the key to success to a 
successful response plan.  
     With the known vague clinical presentations associated with anthrax, the 
OEHN can expect delays in diagnosis, treatment plans, and associated morbidity 
and mortality.  The "walking wounded" and "walking worried" will complicate 
the scenario and place increased demands on healthcare professionals and 
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resources as information is processed to make appropriate decisions (Lee, 2007).  
Triage of injured and ill patients will require rapid and astute decision-making.  If 
generator power and batteries for laptops are not available, manual tools such as 
checklists and data boards with which to identify processes, resources, and triage 
decisions should be kept current and available in the event electronic information 
systems are not available.  However, these processes ideally should be automated 
into a database for tracking capability, identifying acuity, obtaining physician 
orders, completing associated work processes, making appropriate plans for 
nursing care, and identifying work-related hazardous risks. 
     Economics   
     The OEHN must address, incorporate, and integrate processes and policies into 
a planning function to address the requirements for and response to an attack.  
The nurse is responsible for effectively managing resource consumption involved 
in such planning.  Business costs will increase, particularly as knowledge of 
potential exposure to anthrax become more accepted as reality.  
     Rogers (2003) states that the economic resources available to an organization 
drive the overall health efforts within that organization.  An example of 
mismatching of preparation versus demand is Hurricane Katrina. Larsen (2007) 
states that FEMA failed to deliver effective and efficient services to the front lines 
in Hurricane Katrina.  FEMA is in a growth state and still demonstrates a "less 
than mature" public response posture for a potential anthrax attack.   
     Rogers notes that the core of occupational health professionals in the 
workforce are registered nurses.  The OEHN works with occupational medicine 
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physicians who frequently contract with worksites.  Jointly, they bear the 
responsibility to develop appropriate programs to include planning for biological 
attack, including anthrax.  As a professional, a process stakeholder, and trusted 
site leader, it is natural for the OEHN to lead and initiate bioterrorism defense 
processes and practices, while consulting with the physician as needed.  
     Population/Healthcare Trends  
     The Rogers' model can be adapted to address the threat of bioterrorism among 
population and healthcare trends (Rogers, 2003).  The demographics in the 
worksite can span three generations with differences in how they view the world, 
politics, healthcare, and the work environment.  The aging population is growing 
and many continue to work beyond age 65 due to economic conditions.  There are 
more female workers in the workforce.  The ethnic influences of Caucasian, 
African American, and Hispanic cultures are in the workplace.  With these 
demographics, there is increased prevalence of co-morbidities to include 
hypertension, heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and cancer in the workplace. 
     From a community point of view, the potential for violence exists.  It may 
stem from societal changes, potentially poor supervision and management 
practices, grieving employees, illicit substance abuse, and availability of weapons 
(to include real and imposter biological agents).  
     Legislation (Regulation/Politics)  
     There are statutes, laws, and regulations on federal, state, and local levels that 
pertain to biochemical preparedness in the workplace.  On the federal level, 
OSHA regulates the occupational safety and health arena with its worker 
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standards and guidelines, some of which address biochemical preparedness and 
hazard communication.  There are 22 states and jurisdictions that operate their 
own state occupational safety and health programs with job safety and health 
standards that are "at least as effective as" comparable federal standards.  
Knowledge of process in the evolution and development of statutes, laws, and 
regulations is an effective and powerful tool.   
     The OEHN must maintain an active and unrestricted nursing license as 
required by the state board of nursing, and practice nursing in accordance with its 
law and rules.  With the influx of media attention on public health, terrorism, and 
funding cuts, the OEHN must stay abreast of lobbying activities through active 
membership in professional nursing associations to express a voice in professional 
decision-making.  To learn the important organizational power infrastructure and 
dynamics, the OEHN must interact effectively with other peer groups and 
influence appropriate change in practice, biological exposure preparation, and 
health promotion.  
     Inputs 
     Corporate Culture/Mission  
     With a corporate infrastructure built prior to the threat of terrorism, formerly 
disinterested organizational cultures are now forced to deal with bioterrorism 
issues through regulatory directives.  Work philosophies will change as people 
and organizations learn more about bioterrorism, and in turn, update their policies 
and procedures.  Organizational culture will adjust with the expansion of 
knowledge into practice (Rogers, 2003).    
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     Workforce  
     As a whole, the workforce across the nation is already affected by bioterrorism 
attacks with increased security concerns, particularly within the federal 
government and the transportation industry (Rogers, 2003).  Employees will feel 
more secure in their worksite if they know how to respond to a simple and well 
rehearsed, clear, succinct bioterrorism response plan.  
     Work Processes and Related Hazards  
     In the face of a potential attack, the requirement for solid understanding of 
worksite processes and process improvement requires knowledge and advanced 
education for the OEHN (Rogers, 2003).  There is an increased likelihood of a 
biological attack, and the prospect of managing an anthrax exposure with an aging 
worker population makes this all the more challenging.  Healthcare providers 
need to incorporate common sense "how-to" applications into policy, planning, 
and practice to respond to a biological attack.       
      Human/Operational/Capital Resources 
     An anthrax attack will be expensive.  People fear what they do not know and   
what they do not understand.  Consequently, companies, agencies, and healthcare 
systems will become overtaxed because of the volume of people affected.  
Planning an appropriate response with the necessary resources such as a central 
command post, physicians and nurses, field locations, facilities such as tents, 
stretchers, and medical supplies/equipment requires a forward thinking team.  The 
OEHN must be prepared with knowledge and well developed skill set to address 
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notifications, emergency response processes, and specific laws and regulations 
regarding occupational health (Rogers, 2003). 
     Informational Resources/Data   
     Accurate information and sound data are necessary to make effective decisions 
(Rogers).  It is likely that manual record systems will be instituted.  They could 
likely become the backbone of an organization's ability to survive an attack.  
Checklists and data boards in a central command post are instrumental in 
communicating with others.   
     Given the luxury of electrical power, automated record keeping will be 
inundated with data entry and data management requirements.  Databases will be 
required and algorithms for diagnosis selection/treatment will be highly desirable.  
Networks will likely be slowed and overwhelmed by user demand for rapid 
information, if they are available.  
     Organizational/Occupational Health and Goals  
     Occupational health goals are congruent with organizational goals to insure a 
safe and healthful work environment (Rogers).  The OEHN screens, approves, 
and teaches employees crucial and appropriate use of health principles and 
appropriate use of personal protective equipment in the workplace.  In a single 
nurse unit, worker placement within the facility will be important with the most 
knowledgeable and clinically skilled employees handling triage and placement of 
the injured or exposed population.    
     Effective, detailed plans with well rehearsed practices will help survival and 
return to normalcy in the workplace.  In the long-term, adequate 
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medical/healthcare and rehabilitation for ill and injured workers will be addressed 
with short-term and long-term disability.  Addressing and optimizing the 
individual health of the worker/workforce is crucial to survive an anthrax 
exposure event.   
     Throughputs 
     Clinical, Analytical Skills, Knowledge, Experience   
     The competent OEHN instills knowledge and experience into staff and line 
employees equally (Rogers, 2003).  The OEHN researches, presents, and teaches 
biological defense nursing principles to employees in a number of settings beyond 
staff and safety meetings such as walkthroughs, clearance for PPE, and routine 
interactions with employees.  Integrating readiness into every day practice is the 
responsibility of the OEHN.  For example, since the airborne anthrax exposure 
requires airway protection, it is incumbent that staff understands and demonstrates 
readiness in donning, wearing, and ultimately disposing of airway equipment. 
     Collaborative Decision-Making Skills and Processes  
     Organizationally, the OEHN and the occupational healthcare team collaborate 
in decision-making and organizational processes (Rogers).  Thought must be 
given to the employee's level of knowledge, current response, and goal 
expectations during an anthrax exposure.   
     Interpersonal Negotiation Skills  
     The OEHN must have positive interpersonal and negotiation skills with 
colleagues and staff to optimize success in developing a response plan for the 
worksite (Rogers).  These professional interpersonal skills are required to win, 
 38 
 
appropriate, allocate, and manage time, human resources, and technical and 
funding resources to accomplish basic biological readiness goals.   
     Program Management and Objectives 
     The OEHN should lead and coordinate the response model management 
functions which involve employee health to insure that all systems are included 
(Rogers, 2003).  Examples are budget planning, clearance for management of 
hazardous waste operations, and safety and environmental activities.  
     Documentation, Policies, and Procedures   
     The OEHN is in a leadership positions within the worksite (Rogers).  As the 
response model is developed and implemented, individual understanding of the 
bioterrorism response plan, tasks, and expectations is crucial.  Every employee, 
from CEO to the newest employee, must be aware and willing to cooperate in the 
response model process. 
     Interventions 
     Clinical Scope of Practice 
     The demands of bioterrorism on everyday life require the OEHN to adapt 
her/his nursing practice accordingly.  Bioterrorism elevates the practice of 
occupational and environmental health nursing to a more active advanced role in 
recognizing and effectively treating signs and symptoms of anthrax.  Management 
of early signs and symptoms of the disease will require finely tuned acute care 
assessment skills.  As evidenced by Dr. Lee's (2007) work, many internal 
medicine physicians were not only aware, but were also quite accurate in their 
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early diagnosis, treatment, evaluation, and team planning in the aftermath of the 
2001 anthrax scare.  The same will be expected of the OEHN in the future. 
     In the aftermath of an attack, experts forecast a huge demand for mental health 
professionals to treat a range of issues from situational anxiety to frank depression 
to post traumatic stress disorder (Artenstein, 2005).  The "walking wounded" may 
be outnumbered by the "walking worried", easily overwhelming local healthcare 
resources (Lee, 2007).      
     Health Promotion/Health Protection/Prevention   
     As statutory changes and nursing practice adjusts to bioterrorism as a norm, 
the OEHN will incorporate principles of health promotion and prevention into 
policy, training, education, and every day practice (Rogers, 2003).  The OEHN 
must take an active leadership role in nursing organizations to educate and 
influence change in biological preparation and health promotion.      
     Health/Hazard Assessment and Surveillance  
     The OEHN will have to respond to biohazard exposure in the workplace as 
employees report with clinical signs and symptoms of disease processes and 
occupational injuries.  Astute triage skills are critical for early recognition of signs 
and symptoms in an anthrax attack (Lee, 2007).  
     Workplace Surveillance and Hazard Detection   
     The OEHN and response team routinely conduct active workplace surveillance 
and identification of hazard risks.  In the event of suspicious behavior, the 
employer and employee assistance professionals will investigate and address the 
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problem.  A policy developed by human resources for dealing with unacceptable 
behavior is necessary (Rogers, 2003). 
     Occupational Health/Primary Care   
     The OEHN is key in the planning and education processes for an organization 
(Rogers).  The nurse must be well versed in biological agents such as anthrax and 
understand how to apply effective emergency plans in case of an exposure.  This 
preparation will reap significant benefits in methodical exposure management, 
casualty care, and positive outcomes. 
     Case Management   
     The Rogers' model cites case management which requires a thorough 
understanding of the consequences of anthrax exposure, plans for recovery from 
such an exposure, and goals for returning ill or injured employees to work.  An 
understanding of the exposure and the short-term/long-term disability system is 
necessary (Rogers).  
     Counseling  
     Counseling of staff and workers requires prior understanding of the agent, 
exposure, treatment, return-to-work expectations, disability goals, and desired 
outcomes.  Again, understanding the exposure and the short-term/long-term 
disability system would be beneficial to staff (Rogers).  
     Training/Education   
     Annual training and education of staff requires the use of research-based 
updates in anthrax care from the CDC.  The OEHN is in a prime position to 
educate employees about the response plan (Rogers).  Visual aids such as power 
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point presentations on the response plan would be useful in communicating 
meaningful information to staff and employees alike. 
     Research  
     The OEHN must not only understand basic anthrax care, but remain updated 
with information from the CDC and other professional sources of information 
(CDC, 2009b).  Deemy (2003) believes that in the absence of known facts, the 
OEHN must glean facts from the literature, attending to and incorporating details 
and knowledge of reports of biological training events, and experiences to prepare 
for a potential exposure at the worksite.  
     Outputs 
     Preventing Illness and Injury, Occupational and Non-Occupational 
     The OEHN is in a key position to understand the preventive measures in 
illness and injury (Rogers, 2003).  Expanding knowledge about the management 
of anthrax will require individual commitment, and personal discipline to research 
and keep current in emergency responder care, treatment modalities, and 
availability of nearest medical resources and services. 
     Risk Reduction   
     Risk reduction will necessitate routine teaching of staff on the basic 
characteristics of anthrax, risk potential, emergency plans, readiness of personal 
protective equipment and periodic drill in the management of an anthrax exposure 
event.  The OEHN is a critical part of the successful planning, management, and 
teaching processes at their worksite (Rogers).  Emergency planning, triage, and 
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community resources requires knowledge of the staff and the available services at 
local facilities. 
     Improved Worker Health/Safety/Working Conditions  
     Adult learning principles demonstrate that workers who are well prepared to 
respond to emergencies through active participation in education and training 
respond much more effectively to real life emergencies (Larsen, 2007).  Periodic 
review of the emergency response plan in the policy and procedure manual via 
computer-based training and education sessions will assure that all workers are 
aware of the expectations in an anthrax attack, including use of appropriate 
personal protective equipment. 
     Better Quality of Life  
     Employees who observe proactive and proven safety measures in response 
plan training will be more satisfied with their general work environment.  They 
will be aware that management has planned for a biological attack which 
intuitively reassures employees of safety in the workplace and management's 
interest in quality of life (Rogers, 2003).  With the looming threat of a biologic 
attack, "security needs to become as intrinsic to corporate America as safety" in 
the workplace (Larsen, p. 209). 
     Cost Containment  
     The cost to implement response plan training and preparation should be noted 
in the beginning of the process.  However, the savings may prove immeasurable 
in direct and indirect savings in human and facility resources. 
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     Feedback 
     Goal Achievement   
     Goals in a response plan should be clearly written.  They must support the 
objectives of the business's organizational plan, budget, and funding cycles. 
     Quality Assurance  
     Specific desired outcomes should be identified in the beginning of a response 
plan.  The outcomes should be clear, succinct, and address plan processes with the 
appropriate organizational questions:  Does the employee understand the meaning 
of the communications systems during a biological attack?  Does the employee 
know and demonstrate how to properly don his/her PPE?  Can the company 
successfully recover from an attack?  Does the plan actually work? (Larsen, 
2007). 
     Budget Performance  
     Biological defense will be expensive, particularly at the onset of planning and 
initial expenses (Larsen).  Plans for a general response plan should be 
incorporated into budget cycles.  Farsighted managers might introduce the 
concept with a basic funding line with their clinic budget.  This simple step brings 
positive attention to management's commitment to current safety and health 
issues.  The funding line will most likely be consumed in training, education, and 
multi-purpose personal protective equipment (PPE).  When PPE is multi-purpose 
in its design and function, cost effectiveness becomes more acceptable to 
managers and budget planners.  
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     Healthcare Trend Analysis   
     Tracking and trending processes, associated risks, and costs associated with 
injury and illness from the OSHA log form the basis for major health 
expenditures.  Objectives could then be tailored for developing a program with 
the appropriate indicators and processes.  Response planning for a biologic attack 
may identify areas for improvement and cost savings within the worksite.  
     Satisfaction Surveys  
     Satisfaction surveys reflect the culture and the regard to which employees 
value the effectiveness of worksite services. Rogers (2003) writes that the value 
of an occupational health program is measured by the respect to which the 
employees hold those services.  Employees must be taught the organizational 
response plan, the importance of PPE, and required actions to survive.  For the 
OEHN, the ultimate success of a biological response plan translates into survival.   
     Cost Effectiveness   
     Budget analysis needs may prove initially difficult to justify.  However, 
identifying risk management issues associated with a biological attack may open 
the door to basic funding and planning discussions.  
     With the comprehensive nature of systems theory in mind, the Rogers' model 
allows the OEHN to effectively address and capture the concept and scope of a 
response plan within the organization.  The model gives the OEHN a framework 
to identify influences both outside and inside the organization.  The systems and 
subsystems prompt the OEHN to ask questions and coordinate planning steps.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
     In contrast to a dirty bomb or car bombing which by nature would be a well-
defined, distinct event, biological events are stealth, blurry, and insidious by 
nature, taking a period of time up to days or weeks to manifest.  Therefore, 
healthcare providers must be aware and ready for a host of variables in exposure, 
dispersion, incubation, and clinical presentation (Schoch-Spana, 2003).  Nursing 
experts studying these disease processes have identified distinct principles for 
approaching and managing unknown scenarios.  Specifically, one medical expert 
in biological defense and infection control acknowledges the astute observations 
of internists in the 1999 New York City West Nile outbreak, the 2001 anthrax 
attack cases, and the 2003 SARS epidemic (Lee, 2007).   
Resources and Supplies      
     Likewise, within an organization, effective planning demands resources and 
supplies needed based on the hierarchy of human needs (Larsen, 2007).  
Similarly, the OEHN is crucial in the planning of supplies, resources, in-place 
sheltering, transportation, and communication requirements.  As such, these plans 
must be applicable and convey a sense of worth to the organization and value to 
the employees.  To shift this thinking process and make it malleable, practical, 
understandable, and easy to understand, Larsen writes that people must be 
prepared to translate personal and home requirements into business requirements.  
     From a practical standpoint, the supplies identified in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
should be gathered, organized, and scaled to the size of the organization and  
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TABLE 5.1 
PERSONAL BIOLOGICAL ATTACK CHECK LIST  
Item Notes/Where to Find Supplies 
1. AHA Basic Life Support training   
2. Red Cross First Aid training/kits with 
medical supplies 
 
3. Five days of nonperishable food  
     a.  peanut butter  
     b.  canned tuna  
     c.  canned fruit   
     d.  nuts  
     e.  energy bars  
     f.  crackers  
4. Two weeks of drinking water and 
supplies per adult.  Plan one gallon 
for drinking and hygiene purposes 
 
5. Flashlights with fresh batteries/bulbs  
6. Portable TV/radio and batteries  
7. Cash, coins, credit cards  
8. Copies of major family/med records   
9. Individual changes of clothing and 
feminine supplies 
 
Source:  Adapted from Larsen, 2007   
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TABLE 5.2 
PROFESSIONAL BIOLOGICAL ATTACK CHECK LIST  
Item Notes/Where to Find Supplies 
1. First aid kit containing non-sterile 
bandages of various sizes and shapes  
 
2. Sterile dressings   
3. Tape/wipes   
4. Medications to include antibiotic 
ointment  
 
5. Scissors/tweezers   
6. Cold packs  
7. N-95 face masks/shields, gloves, 
shoe covers   
 
8. First aid manual for teenagers and 
younger children 
 
9. Aspirin for minor headache 
discomfort pain 
 
10. Anti-diarrhea medication for 
gastrointestinal distress 
 
11. Antacids for gastrointestinal reflux 
issues 
 
12. Activated charcoal for potential 
accidental toxic ingestion 
 
13. Contact lenses for personal use  
14. Extra eyeglasses for backup  
15. Tool kit for emergency repairs  
16. Toilet paper for personal hygiene  
17. Towelettes for personal hygiene  
18. Complete changes of clothing   
19. Matches to start pilot lights on gas 
heaters 
 
20. Feminine hygiene supplies  
21. Dental needs to include general care 
items and floss 
 
22. Food utensils for nourishment as well 
as tool use 
 
23. Paper towels for clean up  
24. Paper and pencil for practical use  
25. Books, games, puzzles for children  
26. Fire extinguisher for immediate 
safety concerns 
 
Source:  Adapted from Larsen, 2007   
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potential response.  Expiration dates must be checked and supplies rotated to keep 
the materials usable.  Within an organization, these resources should be kept in a 
central area where personnel can locate and retrieve the supplies with ease.  
Communication 
     The OEHN should provide clear and concise communication to employees 
which instills a sense of personal control.  Effective communication systems must 
be planned and in place.  Given access to computers, one source might include the 
CDC (2009a) anthrax exposure message templates for standardization of 
emergency information.    
     Infection control principles must be sound in application.  Isolation means a 
defined location with ventilation, medical capability, and nursing resources, such 
as a polyfiber tent in a remote location with positive pressure, butyl rubber PPE, 
electrical power, and a water source.  It might mean the isolation room next to the 
entrance to an emergency department with negative air flow.  Adequate transport 
resources must be identified with equipment appropriate for anthrax management.   
     Knowing transmission patterns, appropriate PPE and current information 
regarding methods of protection will allow the most effective management of 
anthrax exposure (Salazar, 2002).  It is absolutely crucial that organizations plan 
for emergency supplies; the OEHN can effectively drive that process.   
     In short, as part of the re-design process, the new Department of Homeland 
Security Chief Medical Officer presented to the 2006 graduates of the University 
of North Carolina's School of Public Health Policy and Administration certificate 
program, "We must reorganize to plan for disease attacks by protecting people...at 
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a local level…" (University of North Carolina Chapel Hill School of Public 
Health [UNC CH SPH], 2006).  
     Current literature acknowledges there is a shortage of nurses, specifically 
OEHNs.  OEHNs are experts in disease surveillance processes (Akins, Williams, 
Silenas & Edwards, 2005).  Larsen (2007) states a reorganization of the public 
health infrastructure and systems is absolutely necessary to serve the security 
needs with emphasis on "regions" instead of the current public health 
infrastructure which he likens to "an organization with little to no funding, only 
one tank, a platoon and an airplane...where promotion was not based on 
competency, but political connections" (p. 110).  
Transportation, Shelter, and Evacuation       
     The science of planning translates into information management of goals, 
processes, emergency contacts/numbers, employee expectations, family 
awareness, and expected outcomes in the ability to survive and operate (ATSO) 
phase of an anthrax attack.  The art of this planning is the absence of panic and 
disorder through preparation, training, and organization-wide sharing of outcomes 
and expectations.  Sheltering in-place may be the safest of all phases of 
transportation (Larsen).  Returning home safely and intact at the end of this 
experience is the final proof of success.   
Policy   
     In the Rogers' model, a succinct, written, coordinated disaster policy and plan 
must address key topics such as management of prevention and containment of 
injuries, as well as guidelines for managing exposure, points of contact, and 
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realistic expectations for services and care.  This plan must be written prior to any 
exposure event (Salazar, 2002).  Experts acknowledge that the planning process 
will not be straight-forward or linear in ease of design (D'Alessandro & 
D'Alessandro, 2005).  
     Knowledgeable employees must be incorporated as partners within the 
organization.  Larsen (2007) emphasizes "prior deliberate/crisis planning, testing 
systems frequently, and paying attention to detail" insures consistency in 
outcomes (p. 203).   
     Recognizing key individual talents and skills and recruiting them for their 
abilities, Larsen notes that employees are likely to facilitate a better coordinated 
response, use their resources well, and assure their own and co-workers' safety.  
Conversely, from management's perspective, individual response may pose real 
challenges to the worksite leadership team.  Deemy (2003) states that in a 
biological attack, decisions to treat or not to treat in large groups of patients 
conditioned to access to "premium care" will add to ethical dilemmas. 
     The OEHN must think beyond the local over-tasked hospital for resources.  
Larsen believes that even with stringent efforts and excellent preparation, given 
an attack, only a fraction of lives can be saved.  The OEHN must be prepared to 
serve as a knowledgeable public health resource in conjunction with state and 
local resources (Salazar). 
Research 
     Work is already in progress to address clinical responses and bio-behavioral 
consequences after exposure to biological agents.  Focused on the sudden, 
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unexpected nature of the biological attack, these researchers emphasize the 
absolute requirement for proactive planning, proven communication systems, and 
demonstrated preparedness in first responder teams. 
     Nursing experts recommend future research in the following areas:  
1. Early detection   
 Commercial software treatment algorithms to detect biological attack 
backed up by manual processes.   
2. Understanding of exposure  
 Vectors and modes of transmission of airborne anthrax. 
3. Biobehavioral responses to threats and injury  
 Understanding of toxic agents and their effects, knowledge of the disease 
process, appropriate isolation procedures, and treatment. 
4. Biodefense planning and response capacities  
 An assessment of current resources on-hand versus community 
supply/demand. 
 Current planning and response capacities evaluated for organizational 
"fit". 
 An assessment of what the organization can do for itself and where plans 
and resources may need to be altered. 
5. Potential bioethical issues  
 An assessment of injury, resource consumption, and potential life saving, 
keeping in mind that the most injured, sickest patients may not survive.   
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6. Research training  
 Incorporation of nursing science into biological defense with systems 
modeling and planning.   
7. Partnerships in funding and research  
 Nurse researchers must be engaged in partnerships to strengthen their 
contribution to biodefense such as the NIH General Clinical Research 
Centers and the Department of Veterans Affairs (Sigmon & Larsen, 2003). 
Education  
     Current writers acknowledge the lack of standard education for nurse providers 
mixed with a shortage of public health nurses (Akins et al., 2005).  Evolving 
education in biological agents, planning for management of clinical injuries, as 
well as educating employees requires proactive nursing leadership.  Nursing 
knowledge specific to the Category A agents is critical to planning, response 
training, and managing strategies in bioterrorism.  Preparedness at the individual 
level is crucial to success.  At the individual level, one author states the OEHN 
must master four crucial skills:  visibility, congruency, emotional intelligence, and 
communication.  The OEHN must realize the importance of credibility in the 
workplace, particularly during a time of crisis (Strasser, 2002).  As part of the 
general nursing education, these introductory skills combined with a baseline 
knowledge and competencies in bioterrorism agents must be instilled into 
baccalaureate programs and updated through periodic continuing education.  The 
OEHN must know how to recognize a biological attack, organize an effective 
response, and manage the exposure with calm and deliberate thought and actions.   
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Conclusion 
     The occupational and environmental health nurse is in the right place to make 
revolutionary changes in nursing practice based on scientific evidence and 
knowledge.  The OEHN knows government efforts have appeared well-funded in 
the past, but now are in jeopardy with budget cuts; many have fairly well-
developed websites citing internal plans shielded from the public domain.  
However, the government agencies observed are immature, disjointed, and 
amateur in their problem-solving processes.  The literature reveals patchy and 
poorly coordinated processes in joint planning, policy, research, education, and 
ultimately, practice processes (Larsen, 2007).  Armed with that knowledge, it is 
up to the occupational health nursing profession to identify those processes, 
actions, and practices to protect individuals, employees, and worksites (Sigmon & 
Larsen, 2003).  From blue prints and floor plans to step-by-step process definition 
and development to exercising those plans so that employees are prepared and 
know the plan, the OEHN has the knowledge base to define how to effectively 
and properly respond to an anthrax attack.  The plan may not be perfect, but it 
should be useful and effective.  Starting with the CDC website for emergency 
action planning and using Larsen's checklists, the OEHN can easily put together a 
reasonable action plan for a biological exposure.  Armed with the appropriate 
resources, knowledge, and tools from the CDC, the OEHN may identify an 
appropriate location, shelter, supplies, equipment, and people resources into a 
simple, basic, and straightforward two week survival plan.  Following suit with 
the Rogers' model, the OEHN is assured of thoroughness within a systems 
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framework.  Systems theory thinking will improve successful and complete 
problem solving processes as the OEHN integrates the exposure plan into 
organizational-level plans.  
     Given the facts surrounding responses to previous biological attacks (Lee, 
2007), the OEHN has the foresight and proactiveness in short- and long-term 
planning, and resource requirements.  Creating a response plan to the threat of a 
biologic attack such as anthrax is a new, but attainable challenge to the OEHN 
planning skill set.  Using the Rogers' model and the OSHA checklists cited, the 
OEHN is in a key position to ask the right questions, pull together current 
biological defense practices, develop and implement, and evaluate efficient work 
processes, and refine robust policies into a cost-effective, lifesaving response plan 
with desirable clinical outcomes.  The OEHN must be willing to invest the time 
and effort.  That time is now.   
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APPENDIX 
ROGERS' CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAMS AND SERVICES 
ENVIRONMENTAL                                                                                                                                                            INFLUENCES 
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